

A New International Order and Its Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy

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Before I present my view of "A New International Order and Its Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy" I wish to make two points clear. First, I believe the first priority of any President is to assure the military security of our nation. And I am confident we can afford to spend whatever is required to accomplish that task. But to spend more than is required, as I believe we are doing today, is to fail to recognize the "opportunity cost" of diverting resources from programs designed to address the economic and social problems, of near crisis proportions, that are confronting our society today.

Second, I wish to emphasize that the defense budget, if it is to provide maximum security at minimum cost, must be a function of three factors: 1) clearly stated foreign policy goals, 2) an analysis of the threats we face in pursuing those goals, and 3) the development of a military strategy and force structure that assures our security in the face of the projected threats.

We have yet to build a post-cold war defense budget on that basis. To do so requires that we start with a blank sheet of paper. We have not done that. Instead we are carrying on with what is essentially a cold war defense program, trimmed at the edges to

yield reductions of 10% to 15%.

If the nations of the world, developed and developing alike, take advantage of the end of the cold war to move toward a system of collective security—a system in which the Security Council and other multinational organizations play major roles—the risk of war between nations, and the risk of unrestrained conflict within nations, will be substantially reduced. As a consequence, military expenditures across the globe, and certainly within our own country, can be cut dramatically.

Although there has been clear evidence for several years that the cold war was ending, nations throughout the world have been slow to revise their foreign and defense policies, and slow to strengthen regional and international security organizations to reflect that fact.

In the U.S., for example, defense expenditures last year (1992) totalled \$286 billion (in current dollars). In constant dollars that was 14% more than in 1981. Moreover, President Bush's five-year defense program, presented to Congress one year ago, projected that expenditures will decline only very gradually from last year's levels. Defense outlays in 1997, in constant dollars, were estimated to be approximately 10% higher than some 21 years earlier, under President Nixon, in the midst of the cold war.

Such a defense program, even with the further reductions proposed in May 1992 by President Clinton, is not consistent with my view of the post-cold war world.

1051-2438/1993/0304-0178\$03.00/0

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This commentary is adapted from a paper presented at the Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1993.

* which was never really motivated by an external threat -
that it stimulated a plausible
(and a dangerous way, real) one. (Masa Takuma, April 21, 1994. However, leadership
of SU must remove the public relations, not the real intentions.

Before nations can respond in an optimum manner to the end of the cold war, they need a vision of a world that would not be dominated by East-West rivalry, a rivalry that for more than 40 years has shaped foreign and defense programs across the globe.

POST-COLD WAR WORLD: A WORLD OF CONFLICT

As the military action in Iraq, the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the turmoil in Somalia, Angola, Sudan, Armenia, and Tajikistan demonstrate, the world of the future will not be a world without conflict, conflict between disparate groups within nations and conflict extending across national borders. Racial and ethnic differences remain. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historical disputes over political boundaries will continue. Economic differentials among nations, as the technological revolution of the 21st century spreads unevenly across the globe, will increase.

In those respects, therefore, the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past—conflicts within and between nations will not disappear.

But it is also clear that in the 21st century relations among nations will differ dramatically from those of the post-World War II decades. In the postwar years, the U.S. had the power, and to a considerable degree we exercised that power, to shape the world as we chose. In the next century, that will not be possible. While remaining the world's strongest nation, the U.S. will live in a multipolar world, and its foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to that reality.

In such a multipolar world, there clearly is a need for developing new relationships both among the great powers and between the great powers and other nations.

A VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

At a minimum, the new order should accomplish five objectives. It should:

- Provide to all states guarantees against external aggression; frontiers would not be changed by force.
- Codify the rights of minorities and ethnic groups within states—the rights of Muslims within Bosnia, for example—and provide a process by which such groups, who believe their rights have been violated, may seek redress without resort to violence.

- Establish a mechanism for resolution of both regional conflicts, and conflicts within nations, without unilateral action by the great powers.
- Increase the flow of both technical and financial assistance to the developing countries to help them accelerate their rates of social and economic advance.
- Assure preservation of the global environment as a basis of sustainable development for all.

In sum, we should strive to move toward a world in which relations among nations would be based on the rule of law, a world in which national security would be supported by a system of collective security. The conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping functions necessary to accomplish these objectives would be performed by multilateral institutions: a reorganized and strengthened United Nations and new and expanded regional organizations.

That is one vision of the post-cold war world.

AN ALTERNATIVE VISION OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Many political theorists predict a return to the power politics of the 19th century. They claim that with the elimination of ideological competition between East and West, there will be a reversion to more traditional relationships. They say that major powers will be guided by basic territorial and economic imperatives: that the U.S., Russia, China, India, Japan, and Western Europe will seek to assert themselves in their own regions while competing for dominance in other areas of the world where conditions are fluid.

This view has been expressed, for example, by Michael J. Sandel, a political theorist at Harvard. Sandel has said:

The end of the Cold War does not mean an end of global competition between the superpowers. Once the ideological dimension fades, what you are left with is not peace and harmony, but old-fashioned global politics based on dominant powers competing for influence and pursuing their internal interests.

Professor Sandel's conception of relations among nations in the post-cold war world is historically well founded, but it is not consistent with the increasingly interdependent world—interdependent economically, environmentally, and in terms of security—into which we are now moving. In that interdependent world, no nation, including the U.S. will be able to

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stand alone. The U.N. Charter offers a far more appropriate framework for relations among nations in such a world than does the doctrine of power politics.

In contrast to Professor Sandel, Carl Kaysen, former director of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, has written that:

The international system that relies on the national use of military force as the ultimate guarantor of security, and the threat of its use as the basis of order, is not the only possible one. To seek a different system...is no longer the pursuit of an illusion, but a necessary effort toward a necessary goal.

This is exactly what I suggest we undertake. Such a world will need leaders.

The leadership role may shift among nations depending on the issue at hand. Often it will be fulfilled by the United States. However, in such a system of collective security, whenever the U.S. plays a leadership role, it must accept collective decision-making, which will be very difficult for the U.S. Correspondingly, if the system is to survive, other nations must accept a sharing of the risks and the costs: the political risks, the financial costs, and the risk of casualties and bloodshed, which will be difficult for them.

Had the U.S. and the other major powers made clear their conception of and support for such a system of collective security, and had they stated they would not only pursue their own political interests through diplomacy without the use of military force, but would seek to protect nations against attack, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait might well have been deterred.

ARMS REDUCTIONS: NUCLEAR FORCES

While steps are being taken to establish a worldwide system of collective security, the arms control negotiations, including those relating to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which have been underway in several different forums, should be expanded in scope and accelerated in time.

Particular attention should be given to establishing long-term goals for nuclear forces, beyond those incorporated in the START II Agreement, signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush earlier this year. There are today approximately 40,000 nuclear warheads in the world, with a destructive power over 1 million times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Even assuming that the reductions called for by START II are implemented, the stock of nuclear warheads of the five existing nuclear powers is not likely to be reduced

below 9,000 or 10,000 by the year 2003. The danger of nuclear war, the risk of destruction of societies across the globe, will have been lowered but not eliminated. Can we go further? Surely the answer must be Yes.

If there was ever reason to doubt that conclusion, it should have been swept away by the recent disclosures of how close the world came to nuclear disaster in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was a dramatic demonstration of human fallibility, of the degree to which political and military leaders are so often captives of misinformation, misjudgment, miscalculation.

The actions of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States in October 1962 brought these nations to the verge of military conflict. What was not known then, and is not fully recognized today, was how close the world was to the brink of nuclear disaster. Neither the Soviet Union, nor Cuba, nor the United States intended by its actions to create such risks. In order to understand what caused the crisis and how to avoid such events in the future, participants in the decisions relating to it have met together in a series of conferences, of which a meeting chaired by Fidel Castro in Havana, Cuba, in January 1992, was the fifth. Some of the lessons learned from those meetings remain applicable today, as the following brief summary suggests.

By the conclusion of the third meeting, in Moscow in January 1989, it had become clear that the decisions of each of the three nations, immediately before and during the crisis had been distorted by misinformation, miscalculation, and misjudgment. For example:

- Before Soviet missiles were introduced into Cuba in the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union and Cuba believed the United States intended to invade the island in order to overthrow President Castro and remove his government. We had no such intention.
- The United States believed the Soviets would not move nuclear warheads outside the Soviet Union; they never had, but in fact they did. In Moscow, the participants were told that by October 1962, although the CIA at the time was reporting no nuclear weapons on the island, Soviet strategic nuclear warheads had, indeed, been delivered to Cuba, and that their missiles were to be targeted on cities in the United States.
- The Soviets believed the missiles could be introduced into Cuba secretly, without detection, and that when their presence was disclosed, the United

* For how many years in the world
such revision plans have up-dated in
1961, and reached for implementation in
Oct 20, 1963?

States would not respond. Here, too, they were in error.

- Those who urged President Kennedy to destroy the missiles by a U.S. air attack, which in all likelihood would have been followed by a sea and land invasion, were almost certainly mistaken in their belief that the Soviets would not respond with military action. At the time, the CIA had reported 10,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. At the Moscow conference, participants were told there were in fact 43,000 along with 270,000 well-armed Cuban troops. Both forces, in the words of their commanders, were determined to "fight to the death." The Cuban officials estimated they would have suffered 100,000 casualties. The Soviets expressed utter disbelief that we would have thought that, in the face of such a catastrophic defeat, they would not have responded militarily somewhere in the world. The result would very probably have been uncontrollable escalation.

By the end of the meeting in Moscow, two major lessons could be drawn from our discussions: First, that in this age of high-technology weapons, crisis management is dangerous, difficult, and uncertain. Second, because of misjudgment, misinformation, and miscalculation of the kind referred to, it is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action taken by the great powers and their allies. Therefore, we must direct our attention to crisis avoidance.

Some of us, particularly President Kennedy and I, believed that the United States faced great danger during the missile crisis. The Moscow meeting confirmed that judgment. But during the Havana conference, we learned that we had greatly underestimated the danger.

While in Havana, the participants were told by the senior military officer in the Russian delegation, the retired former Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, General Gribkov, that the Soviet forces in Cuba, at the peak of the crisis, possessed 36 nuclear warheads for the intermediate-range missiles that were capable of striking the United States. In addition, Gribkov stated there were nine tactical nuclear warheads to be used against U.S. invasion forces—all this at a time when the CIA was reporting no warheads on the island.

And just a few weeks ago, we learned that last November there was published in the Russian press an article that stated that at the height of the crisis, the

Soviet forces on Cuba possessed not 45 but rather 162 nuclear warheads. Moreover, it was reported that on October 26, the moment of greatest tension, the warheads were moved from their storage sites to positions closer to their delivery vehicles in anticipation of a U.S. invasion. Clearly there was a high risk that in the face of a U.S. attack, which many in the U.S. government—military and civilian alike—were recommending to President Kennedy on October 27 and 28, the Soviet forces would have decided to use the nuclear weapons rather than lose them.

We need not speculate about what would have happened in that event. We can predict the results with certainty.

Although the U.S. forces would not have been accompanied by tactical nuclear warheads, no one should believe that had U.S. troops been attacked with such weapons, the United States would have refrained from a nuclear response. And where would it have ended? In utter disaster.

This brings us back to the point that human beings are fallible. We all make mistakes. In our daily lives they are costly, but we try to learn from them. In conventional war they cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if they were to affect decisions relating to the use of nuclear forces, they would result in the destruction of nations. It can be predicted with confidence that the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a high risk of destruction of societies.

More and more political and military leaders are accepting that basic changes in the world's approach to nuclear weapons are required. Some are going so far as to state that the long-term objective should be to return, insofar as practical, to a nonnuclear world. Les Aspin made such a proposal in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology June 1, 1992. And General Andrew Goodpaster, the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has suggested that, for the first time since the nuclear arms era began, it is conceivable to establish as a long-term goal the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

That is, however, a very controversial proposition. Many leading Western security experts, both military and civilian, continue to believe that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons prevents war. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, has said with reference to a proposal for eliminating nuclear weapons: "It is a plan for making the world safe for conventional warfare. I am therefore not enthusiastic about it." A report of an

Advisory Committee, appointed by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, made essentially the same point. However, even if one accepts their argument, it must be recognized that their deterrent to conventional force aggression carries a very high long-term cost: the risk of a nuclear exchange.

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, recognized this problem nearly 40 years ago. He proposed, therefore, to "universalize the capacity of atomic thermonuclear weapons to deter aggression" by transferring control of nuclear forces to a vetoless United Nations Security Council.

Dulles's concern of 1954 was echoed very recently by a committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences that, in a report signed by General David C. Jones, the retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated "nuclear weapons should serve no purpose beyond the deterrence of—nuclear attack by others."

Should we not begin immediately, therefore, to debate the merits of alternative long-term objectives for nuclear forces of the five declared nuclear powers. We could choose from among three options.

- A continuation of the present strategy of "extended deterrence," but with the U.S. and Russia each limited to approximately 3,500 warheads, the figure agreed upon by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush.
- A minimum deterrent force, as recommended by the committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, with each major nuclear power retaining 1,000 to 2,000 warheads.
- A return, insofar as practicable, to a nonnuclear world.

THE POTENTIAL FOR REDUCTION IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

As we move toward a system providing for collective action against military aggression wherever it may occur, military budgets throughout the world, in both developed and developing countries, can be reduced substantially. They now total nearly \$1 trillion per year. I believe that during this decade that amount, including expenditures in the developing

countries, could be cut in half. The huge savings of approximately \$500 billion per year could be used to address the pressing human and physical infrastructure needs across the globe. In the case of the United States, it should be possible, within five or six years, to cut military expenditures in relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from last year's level of 4.8% to about 2.6% of (approximately \$195 billion in FY '94 dollars). It is too early to predict how the level that the Clinton Administration will propose for the outer years of the current budget cycle will compare with that figure. However, when Secretary Aspin presented the Administration's FY '94 budget of \$276.9 billion, 4.2% of GDP, he referred to it as a "holding action." He stated that he and the Joint Chiefs were carrying out exactly the type of study I believe is required to establish a post-cold war defense strategy and force structure. On the basis of that study the Administration will submit a new five-year defense program to the Congress. It should result in expenditures far below the levels proposed one year ago by President Bush.

CONCLUSION

In sum, with the end of the cold war, I do believe we can create a New International Order. Although we have barely begun to move in that direction, that should be our goal. We should shape our defense program to be compatible with that objective, while at the same time preserving the flexibility needed to confront greater military threats if and when they develop. Threats justifying our current force structure are not present today. They will not develop faster than we could modify a substantially smaller structure to meet them.

If we are bold, if we dare break out of the mind-set that has guided our actions for the past four decades, we can reshape international institutions, as well as relations among nations, and we can reduce the military expenditures, which have been a derivative of such relations, in ways that will lead to a far more peaceful world and a far more prosperous world for all of the peoples of our interdependent globe.

It is the first time in my adult life we have had such an opportunity. Pray God we seize it.